Isidore of Pelusium→Theon|c. 401 AD|Isidore of Pelusium|AI-assisted
arianismmonasticism
To Hypatius.
On what it is to offer oneself in common, and what to offer oneself equally; and what it is to dispute, and not to be contentious; and what it is to be gladdened, and what to take pleasure.
Many people - not only those who compete in the contests of the world outside, but also those who attempt to interpret the divine Scriptures - by not offering themselves as impartial hearers, become the cause of many and varied evils. For some, caring nothing for the truth, applaud to gratify the speakers, as though they were the besotted admirers of charioteers or dancers; while others hiss out of hostility - and this they do often without even having listened carefully to what was said, much less understood it. And from this it often happens that certain men who are not wise, who do not even speak well - perhaps who even speak badly - taking no account of the goodwill of their hearers, nor of their friendship toward them, nor of the hostility of their opponents, on account of which they were applauded; and not only made winged by the applause, but also drunk with self-love, and moreover mastered by prejudice, lay down as doctrine many ill-reputed and laughable opinions; and then, when they ought not even to utter them with their tongue, they try to maintain them as firm. Those, therefore, who attend such discourses ought, knowing that the danger concerns the soul, and that nothing is more to be put first than the truth - and moreover bearing in mind the evils that are born of hostility and of prejudice - to offer themselves as common hearers of the two who speak, yet not as equal hearers. For it is not the same thing, as some suppose. One must indeed listen to both in common, but not assign the equal share to each; rather more to the more intelligent, and less to the more ignorant; and to the wise man, praises, but to the uninstructed man, if he is the sort who can be brought to his senses by censures, censures - and if not, silence. Let this, then, be said concerning the hearers. As for the speakers, I say it is more fitting to dispute, but not to provoke. For men often dispute with friends, but it is the ill-disposed who quarrel contentiously. For in this way the discourse together will become most excellent and most beneficial both to those who expound and to those who listen. For the speakers would in this way be most well-reputed among their hearers, yet not be flattered with praise. For to be well-reputed is, properly, to be judged worthy of acceptance in the souls of the hearers - those souls that cast their votes incorruptibly, without deceit; whereas to be extolled is often done in speech that breathes flattery and is true in nothing. And the hearers would most be gladdened, yet not take mere pleasure. For to be gladdened is to learn something of the finest things, and to whet one's understanding toward the better; whereas to take pleasure is the act of one who is eating something, or doing some such thing through the body. Let these things be observed; let these things be defined; let these things be kept guarded; and there will be great advancement, not only among the hearers toward virtue, but also among those who attempt to speak toward philosophy.
On what it is to offer oneself in common, and what to offer oneself equally; and what it is to dispute, and not to be contentious; and what it is to be gladdened, and what to take pleasure.
Many people - not only those who compete in the contests of the world outside, but also those who attempt to interpret the divine Scriptures - by not offering themselves as impartial hearers, become the cause of many and varied evils. For some, caring nothing for the truth, applaud to gratify the speakers, as though they were the besotted admirers of charioteers or dancers; while others hiss out of hostility - and this they do often without even having listened carefully to what was said, much less understood it. And from this it often happens that certain men who are not wise, who do not even speak well - perhaps who even speak badly - taking no account of the goodwill of their hearers, nor of their friendship toward them, nor of the hostility of their opponents, on account of which they were applauded; and not only made winged by the applause, but also drunk with self-love, and moreover mastered by prejudice, lay down as doctrine many ill-reputed and laughable opinions; and then, when they ought not even to utter them with their tongue, they try to maintain them as firm. Those, therefore, who attend such discourses ought, knowing that the danger concerns the soul, and that nothing is more to be put first than the truth - and moreover bearing in mind the evils that are born of hostility and of prejudice - to offer themselves as common hearers of the two who speak, yet not as equal hearers. For it is not the same thing, as some suppose. One must indeed listen to both in common, but not assign the equal share to each; rather more to the more intelligent, and less to the more ignorant; and to the wise man, praises, but to the uninstructed man, if he is the sort who can be brought to his senses by censures, censures - and if not, silence. Let this, then, be said concerning the hearers. As for the speakers, I say it is more fitting to dispute, but not to provoke. For men often dispute with friends, but it is the ill-disposed who quarrel contentiously. For in this way the discourse together will become most excellent and most beneficial both to those who expound and to those who listen. For the speakers would in this way be most well-reputed among their hearers, yet not be flattered with praise. For to be well-reputed is, properly, to be judged worthy of acceptance in the souls of the hearers - those souls that cast their votes incorruptibly, without deceit; whereas to be extolled is often done in speech that breathes flattery and is true in nothing. And the hearers would most be gladdened, yet not take mere pleasure. For to be gladdened is to learn something of the finest things, and to whet one's understanding toward the better; whereas to take pleasure is the act of one who is eating something, or doing some such thing through the body. Let these things be observed; let these things be defined; let these things be kept guarded; and there will be great advancement, not only among the hearers toward virtue, but also among those who attempt to speak toward philosophy.
AI-assisted translation - This translation was produced with AI assistance and has not been peer-reviewed. See the 19th-century translation or original Latin/Greek below for scholarly use.